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RETAIL COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY
DAVID C. HJELMFELT*
Retail competition among electric utilities has long been recognized as
not being in the public interest.' There is reason to believe that today retail
competition may in fact be in the public interest. Regulatory practices,
however, often prevent or restrict such competition.
I. THE NATURE OF RETAIL COMPETITION
Retail competition-that is, competition for sales to ultimate consumers
of electricity-may take a variety of forms. First, distribution facilities may
be duplicated, permitting door-to-door competition. 2 Second, utilities may
compete for customers along the fringes of their service territories. 3 Third,
interfuel competition may exist between an electric utility and an alternative
fuel supply, such as natural gas. Fourth, electric utilities may compete for a
franchise to serve a block of customers at retail. Fifth, utilities may compete
to attract new industries to their service territories.4 Sixth, performance
comparisons between electric utilities may provide a form of yardstick
competition.
5
The focus of this article is on the first two forms of retail competition-
door-to-door or direct and fringe area-for these are the competitive forms
most often discouraged by regulation. Of these forms, fringe area competi-
tion requires some elaboration.
* B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Duke University; Member, Bar Associations of
Colorado, District of Columbia, and Kansas.
1. Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated Monopolies: The Search for Substantive Stan-
dards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 566 (1977); compare Kellman & Marino, City of Cleveland v.
CEI: A Case Study In Attempts To Monopolize By Regulated Utlities, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 5 (1981)
(claiming advantages of retail competition).
2. Although this form of competition is considered unusual in the electric utility industry,
no reliable statistics quantify the extent of the competition. Notable examples of door-to-door
competition are found in the cities of Cleveland, Ohio, and Lubbock, Texas.
3. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Indust: The Impact ofAntitrust Poliy, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 64, 94 (1972).
4. Most investor-owned utilities engage in efforts to attract new industry to their service
area. Some economists have argued that electric rates have little impact in attracting customers
to a utility's service area. But see Pace, Relevant Markets and the Nature of Competition in the Electric
Util'ty Indust, 16 ANTrrRUST BULL. 725 (1971). However, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) staff took the opposite approach in testimony filed in Minnesota Power &
Light Co. in Docket No. ER78-425 (FERC 1978).
5. Even critics of yardstick competition recognize that performance comparisons may
provide an effective means of applying pressure on electric utilities to improve performance.
Pace, supra note 4, at 764-65; Stelzer, Testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) in Docket Nos. 50-329A and 50-330A
(NRC), cited at 6 NRC 892, 982 (1977).
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A. Fringe Area Competition
Fringe area competition generally occurs between a municipal system
and an investor-owned system, a municipal system and a rural electric coop-
erative, or a rural electric cooperative and an investor-owned utility. Many
investor-owned utilities have refrained from competing for fringe-area cus-
tomers, even when free to do so. Ohio Edison Company, Toledo Edison
Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company agreed in the
early 1960's not to compete.6 In one instance a municipal system engages in
fringe-area competition with both a cooperative and an investor-owned util-
ity, 7 and in at least one situation, two municipal systems compete. 8
No matter what the identity of the competing entities, most will likely
compete to provide service to suburban residential areas, shopping centers,
strip commercial areas, and industrial areas. The latter two categories are
usually the most hotly contested. 9 These areas tend to provide high revenue
per customer and high revenue per dollar of plant investment because of the
large load per customer. Such areas are considered valuable additions to a
utility's service area.
1. Restraints on Fringe Area Competition
Fringe area competition may be restrained through the exercise of a
municipality's franchise power, by state statute, 10 by agreements between
the parties, or by restraints imposed by a wholesaler on the area in which
power can be sold at retail (usually an area of competition in which the
wholesale supplier also sells at retail).'I Recent changes occurring in the
relationship between electric utilities and their customers, largely as a result
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),' 2 may fur-
ther reduce retail competition. For example, there is a renewed emphasis on
co-generation, in which an industry that requires heat in its manufacturing
process can utilize waste process heat to generate electricity both for its own
use and for sale to an electric utility. Former Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) Chairman Curtis stated that he would favor policies
encouraging utility ownership of up to fifty percent of the co-generation fa-
cility.' 3 The resulting close relationship between the utility and the indus-
trial user makes it unlikely that the industrial user would respond to
competitive overtures from another electric utility.
However, it has also been argued that co-generation could force in-
creased competition in the form of generation cost comparisons, potential
6. Toledo Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979).
7. Dothan, Ala.
8. City of Fairhope, Ala., and Riviera Utilities Co., owned by the City of Foley, Ala.
9. W.R. Mayben, Legal, Engineering and Economic Aspects of Service Area Disputes
(Oct. 29, 1973) (paper presented to American Public Power Ass'n Legal Seminar).
10. Meeks, supra note 3, at 95.
11. For example, the wholesale contracts of Ohio Edison as they existed in the early and
mid-1960's employed such restraints. See Toledo Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16,
30, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
13. Inside FERC, Nov. 3, 1980, at 2.
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loss of major retail industrial customers, and competition from co-generators
for sales at wholesale to existing distribution systems.'
4
The potential for new co-generation facilities may be large. According
to the Edison Electric Institute, co-generators in 1900 produced half the na-
tion's electricity-a figure that had declined to five percent by 1974.15 Co-
generation provides a great increase in fuel efficiency. A typical electric util-
ity is thirty-two percent efficient, while a co-generator may be eighty percent
efficient. 16
Also, as a result of PURPA, utilities are inserting remotely controlled
load management devices in houses and commercial buildings. Utilities are
also investing in energy conservation features in individual homes, such as
attic insulation or thermal storage heaters, for which customers pay a
monthly fee.17 The resulting blurring of the distinction between consumer
and seller will further reduce opportunities for retail competition between
electric utilities.
II. REGULATION Is NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR COMPETITION
Economists who favor competition believe it will produce the most effi-
cient allocation of resources over long periods of time.' 8 Presumably, man-
agement faced with competition will be forced to adopt the best technology
and provide the best service at the lowest cost. On the other hand, when no
competition exists output will be reduced as management maximizes profits.
Service may be reduced because sales are assured even when consumers are
not treated well.
Historically economists identified certain utility firms as local monopo-
lies; in a very restricted geographic area, one utility could most efficiently
serve the demand. Over time, and with no real factual support, this concept
was expanded until utilities were considered natural monopolies regardless
of where they provided services. 19 Under the natural monopoly concept,
economists, regulators, and legislators concluded that it was inefficient to
have two utilities serving the same area. Thus, to insure the most efficient
allocation of resources and at the same time prevent exploitation by the util-
ity, utilities were allowed to maintain a monopoly status, but were subjected
to regulation.
20
Two factors draw in question the premise that retail competition be-
tween electric utilities should be discouraged. The first is the recognition
that regulation is an inadequate substitute for competition; the second is
that traditional natural monopoly theories have been inappropriately ap-
14. Jones, The National Energy Act and State Commission Regulation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
324 (1980).
15. The Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1981, at 33, col. 4.
16. Id
17. Public Power Weekly, Oct. 6, 1980, at 2.
18. Hamilton, Forward to Pubhk Utilit Law Symposium, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 220
(1980).
19. Dr. Wein, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 18, 819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
20. W. SHEPHERD & W. CLAIR, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 348 (1979).
19821
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plied. This section deals with the adequacy of regulation as a surrogate for
competition.
A. Current Regulatoqv Practices
Former Federal Power Commission (FPC) Chairman Lee White has
been very critical of regulation. White states that: "The game is not Com-
pany A trying to provide better service at lower prices than all other compa-
nies, but rather Company A attempting to secure the highest rate the
regulatory bodies will permit. ' 21 In general, state commissions "operate
with inadequate budgets and are no match for the power companies with
great sums of money at stake."1
2 2
Even when administered well, rate regulation does not insure that rates
charged by electric utilities will be the same as rates in a competitive atmos-
phere.23 Reasonable rates fall within a zone rather than at a discrete point.
A rate may not be so high as to warrant rejection by the regulatory commis-
sion, and yet the same rate may be higher than the rate the electric utility
would accept under the pressure of competition. 24 When rate regulation is
not administered well, utility rates may be even higher. The principal rate
engineer for the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company has stated that as
late as 1976 an electric utility could get as high a return as it wanted on
equity under Ohio rate regulation. Competition from natural gas utilities
provided the only check on rates.
25
Not only does regulation fail to control rates adequately, it cannot in-
sure efficient management or efficient allocation of resources. A tendency
toward over-capitalization clearly exists under present regulatory schemes.
26
Moreover, a regulated company's right to recover cost increases by raising
rates has had a tendency to lessen utility resistance to unreasonable wage
demands.2 7 The current use of automatic rate increases to pass on fuel cost
increases eliminates incentive to shop for the best fuel prices. 28 Other ob-
servers have noted that private utility companies often are managed poorly
because of their freedom from competition. 29 Absent competition, inef-
21. Lee White, The Right to Federally Generated Power 21 (Public Power Ass'n June 11, 1979).
22. d
23. Moore, The Ekctiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970).
24. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatog Poliies, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1207, 1235 (1969).
25. Bingham, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 2905 (N.D. Ohio 1980). For example, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. has
received 92.2% of the rate increases it has requested from 1970 through 1979. Cleveland Press,
July 10, 1980, at 4A, col. 3.
26. Averch and Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, AM. ECON. REV.
1052 (1962); Hughes, Scale Frontiers in Electric Power, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGU-
LATED INDUSTRIES 44 (W. Capron ed. 1971).
27. Turner, supra note 24, at 1232.
28. Interestingly, it has also been argued that fuel adjustment clauses may encourage utili-
ties to use fuel intensive technologies rather than making capital investments that might save
fuel in the long run. Whether current regulation leads to over-capitalization or under-capitali-
zation, the end result remains a misallocation of resources. Leaffer, Automatic Fuel Adjustment
Clauses. Tne For a Hearing, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 228 (1980).
29. C. ELLIS, A GIANT STEP 90-91 (1966). In the past the electric utility industry grew and
prospered in spite of management. Fraser, Utility Bond and Commercial Ratings, PUB. UTILITY
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ficient firms and inefficient management have been recognized as being
under little or no pressure to minimize costs, and are unlikely to be displaced
by those who can do better. 30 For example, in February 1980, the White
House Office of Consumer Affairs joined the state of North Carolina in ask-
ing FERC to initiate an unprecedented investigation of the management of
Virginia Electric and Power Company. 3' They alleged that the company's
plants were "extremely unreliable" and that the company "may have failed
to pursue conversion of oil-fired generating facilities to coal-fired as expedi-
tiously as possible."
'32
Under the present system of utility regulation, many important matters
are left to the utility manager's discretion with little or no regulatory review.
Among the areas receiving little regulatory attention are: 1) reserve levels,
2) reliability criteria, 3) depreciation rates, 4) type, size, and mix of generat-
ing resources, 5) new product development, 6) research expenditures, 7) ag-
gressiveness in dealing with suppliers, and 8) salvage of obsolete plants. In
most instances these matters would be more responsive to competition than
to regulation.
33
If utility regulation is not performing the tasks assigned within an ac-
ceptable margin of error, the commonly accepted justification for substitut-
ing regulation for competition must be examined. Although not the only
rationale for economic regulation, the concept of natural monopoly is the
traditional and most persuasive argument supporting regulation. 34 In large
measure then, the substitution of state regulation for competition in electric
utilities must stand or fall on the application of natural monopoly theories to
the distribution of electricity at the retail level.
III. IS THE RETAIL DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRICITY CHARACTERIZED By
NATURAL MONOPOLY TENDENCIES?
In general terms, a natural monopoly may be said to exist when one
firm can satisfy the demand in a market at a lower cost than if two or more
FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 27, 1973, at 42, 44. Other observers have concluded that the public power
sector which is subject to less formal regulation attracts a more competent management. New-
berg, Two Issues in the Municipal Ownership of Electric Power Distrtbution Systems, 8 BELL J. ECON.
303 (1977). The overall cost of management is less with publicly owned systems. Hamilton,
supra note 18, at 223.
30. Denison, Explanations of Declining Productitv'ty Growth, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Pt. II, Aug.
1979, at 14-15.
31. White House Seeks Probe of Vepco, PUB. POWER WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 1980, at 6.
32. Id
33. The Alabama Public Service Commission concluded that the Alabama Power Co. had
not conducted its business in the most efficient manner, saying that:
We are of the opinion and believe that this record shows that the proper exercise of
"efficient and economical management" dictates that the Company take advantage of
opportunities to divest itself of 25% of the Farley nuclear plant, either to company
affiliates or to the rural Electric Cooperatives and municipal utilities. Such an action
by the Company would make its rates more reasonable to the public.
The Commission, however, was without authority to compel the company to operate more effi-
ciently. Alabama Power Co., No. 17094 at 5-6, (APSC July 12, 1976), aj'd in pertinent part,
Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n (Montgomery County Civ. Ct., Aug. 11,
1976).
34. Fanara, Suelflow and Draba, Energy and Competition: The Saga ofElectrc Power, 25 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 125, 126 (1980).
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firms serve the market. 35 At the outset, it is important to note that the gen-
eral definition is in terms of providing a service, rather than a product, i.e.
the retail distribution of electricity. Also, the focus is on cost to the firm
rather than on price to the consumer. Thus, even if a firm serving a retail
market were to achieve lower costs as a monopoly, it does not follow that the
resulting price to the consumer would be lower than if two firms competed
to serve the market.
Economic literature presents no standard definition of natural monop-
oly theory, and different economists specify different sets of conditions neces-
sary for natural monopoly.3 6 One commentator, Primeaux, has identified
various attributes of natural monopoly and has categorized those which are
or are not dependent on economies of scale 37 -for their implementation or
existence. The attributes dependent upon economies of scale include:
1) economies of scale in production, 2) relatively high fixed costs, 3) a single
producer able to operate at lower costs than if two or more firms serve the
market, 4) the impossibility of a large number of competing plants, 5) higher
customer prices if more than one firm serves the market, and 6) a high de-
gree of price elasticity. Attributes not dependent on economies of scale in-
clude: 1) the necessity for the product or services supplied, 2) inconvenience
to customers caused by duplication of facilities, 3) use of products or services
at the place of production, 4) the existence of special limitations on raw
materials, and 5) an industry characterized by secrecy.
3 8
The characteristics of a natural monopoly identified by Primeaux out-
number the characteristics that most economists would attribute to a natural
monopoly. However, other economists would add the elements of time and
a stable technology. 39 Power production technology is presently undergoing
changes. Generating unit sizes advanced rapidly during the period from
1965 to 1980, with typical units increasing from around 250 megawatts (mw
or 1,000 kilowatts) to as large as 1300 megawatts (mw) for nuclear units. A
very real possibility exists that a long-term trend toward the use of alterna-
tive energy sources such as solar power, wind generation, and the develop-
ment of small hydrogenerating stations will reverse the trend of central
station service. 4°
35. A natural monopoly is one "resulting from economies of scale ... such that one firm
of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can take at a remunerative price, and
can continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm entering the business."
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 965 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting C. KAYSEN
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 191 (1959)).
36. Primeaux, Some Problems With Natural Monopoy, 24 ANTrrRUST BULL. 63 (1979).
37. Primeaux defines economies of scale as existing when unit price declines as the scale of
production increases. Id at 64.
38. Id at 64-65.
39. Dr. Wein, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 18,819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
40. See Feldman and Giordano, Fthantng Dispersed Generation Projects, 37 PUB. POWER
MONTHLY, Mar.-Apr. 1979 at 31. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW I 621a at 48
states that "[d]emand may total millions of dollars annually and yet be 'too thin' relative to the
minimum efficient scale of ... a hydroelectric power generator .... " (emphasis in original).
Changes in production costs and technology have lead to a flurry of applications for develop-
ment of small hydro projects.
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Because the natural monopoly theory is concerned with the firm rather
than the function, production and transmission costs must be considered, as
well as costs of retail distribution. In considering the impact of economies of
scale, long-run decreased costs resulting from expansion of plants must be
distinguished from short-run decreased costs resulting from better utilization
of existing plants. Only the former is relevant to natural monopoly theory.
The latter condition is not necessarily related to increasing returns of scale.
4 1
A. Economies of Scale
Although economies of scale do exist in the production of electricity,
such economies do not continue indefinitely. A study examining economies
of scale in 114 firms revealed that in 1970 a larger share of electrical energy
was generated by firms that had grown beyond the size at which they exper-
ienced economies of scale.4 2 A study of direct competition among electric
utilities found that competition forced firms reaching levels of production up
to 222 million kilowatt-hour (kwh) to produce at a lower average cost than
they would in a non-competitive environment. 43 Primeaux suggests that
monopoly structure generates x-inefficiency, which raises costs of production.
Any cost benefits from economies of scale are more than countered by the x-
inefficiency.44 Thus, even where economies of scale do exist, they are unim-
portant as an attribute of natural monopoly. 45 Studies demonstrating the
exhaustion of economies of scale and the effects of x-inefficiency have led
some commentators to conclude that no natural monopoly results from econ-
omies of scale at the generation level.
46
Related to economies of scale is the fact that electric utilities have a
high fixed-cost investment in relation to the revenue generated. The ratio of
capital investments to revenue in the electric utility industry is about 4 to 1;
for the steel industry, 1.7 to 1; and for retail stores, .3 to 1. The high fixed-
cost ratio of electric utilities by itself has been argued as making utilities
natural monopolies.4 7 The capital employment in various industries is long
lasting in some and short-lived in others. To allow for the differences in life
of capital employed, Primeaux argues that if high fixed capital is relevant,
the measurement should be in terms of output to depreciation of the capital
41. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 66.
42. Christensen & Greene, Economies of Scale in US Electric Power Generation, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 655, 656 (1976). Heuttner & Landon found the long run average cost curve to be U-
shaped, with the lowest cost for firms ranging in size from 1600 mw to 3100 mw. Heuttner &
Landon, Electric Utilities: Scale Economies and Diseconomies, 44 S. EcON. J. 883, 903, 907 (1978).
43. Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, in PRO-
MOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
44. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 68.
45. Id
46. Fanara, Suelflow and Draba, supra note 34, at 137; see Jarrell, The Demand For State
Regulation of the Electric Utlity Indust, J.L. & ECONOMIES 269 (1978); Meeks, supra note 3; Weis,
Antitrust In The Electric Power Indust, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS
(A. Phillips ed. 1975); W. SHEPHERD & W. CLAIR, supra note 20.
47. R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 2 (1956). However, it must be




employed. 48 Application of the output-to-depreciation measurement shows
that capital requirements of electric utilities are not significantly different
from those in industries not considered natural monopolies.
4 9
B. Customer Pr'ces
Another attribute of natural monopolies is that higher customer prices
result when competitors enter the market. As shown above, even if lower
costs resulted from having one producer in a market, there is no assurance
that consumer prices will be lower. Conversely, with reference to the electric
utility industry, it cannot be readily demonstrated that the presence of more
than one firm in the retail market will produce higher consumer costs. Em-
pirical evidence for this proposition is difficult to obtain because of the inter-
vention of rate regulation. Primeaux relies on a comparison of rates between
all cities served by the Missouri Utilities Company and the rates charged by
the company in cities in which it faced competition. In all but two instances
the rates were the same, regardless of whether competition existed. In two
remaining cities, the rate was lower in Poplar Bluff, Missouri, where the
company competed with a municipally-owned utility, and higher in Eldon,
Missouri, where no competition existed. 50 The trouble with this type of
analysis is that most horizontally integrated electric utilities use postage
stamp rates, or rates based upon the company's cost of service to its entire
service area. Thus, the rate to any individual city represents company-wide
costs of service, rather than the actual cost of service to that particular city.
The actual cost to serve customers in a particular city would equal company-
wide costs only by coincidence. Substantial subsidization between groups of
customers served by a utility may occur. Accordingly, the presence of com-
petition could lead to higher consumer prices but for the company's policy of
imposing postage stamp rates. As a result, the focus should be on the cost of
serving a particular market.
Theoretically, it can be shown that the cost of service may be higher
when one firm serves the market than where two firms serve the market.5 If
one assumes that the market considered is one city and that two firms exist
in the market, only a detailed study of the location of the firms on their
respective cost curves can reveal whether costs will be reduced if one firm
serves the entire market. In the typical competitive situation, one firm
would be a relatively small municipally-owned system and the other firm
would be a much larger horizontally and vertically integrated investor-
owned utility. Applying the results of one study, 52 the average total cost
curve for the large utility will at some point begin to rise. Similarly, the
average cost curve for the small firm's existing plant will first decline and
then rise. However, the small firm, unlike the large firm, may yet obtain
economies of scale by installing additional capacity to capture a larger share
48. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 70.
49. Id
50. Id at 78-79.
51. Dr. Wein so demonstrated as part of his testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-560, Tr. 18, 819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
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Market is for 1400 kwh
A serves 400 kwh @ 4€
B serves 1,100 kwh @ 2C
A serves 100 kwh @ 5C
B serves 1300 kwh @ 4¢
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B serves 1,100 kwh @ 2.5¢
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B serves 1,200 kwh (@ 3C
A serves 0
B serves 1,400 kwh @ 5¢











of the load. On Figure 1, such a shift is downward and to the right to A. 53
The calculations of cost to serve the market based upon the assumptions
contained in Figure 1 demonstrate that it is quite possible for the cost of
serving the market to be substantially higher if only one firm serves the mar-
ket. In fact, it is apparent that total costs would be further reduced if a third
firm serving 300 kwh entered the market at a time when Utility A served 300
kwh. The question then becomes one of whether Figure 1 sufficiently com-
ports with reality to be of any analytical value. It is reasonable to conclude
that it does.
1. Distribution and Design
Power production costs are by far the greatest portion of the cost of
providing electric service. The incremental cost of providing service is gener-
ally rising. Distribution costs are generally not more than twenty percent of
the cost of providing service. At least some evidence exists that distribution
53. All of the killowat hour (kwh) figures shown on Figure 1 are unrealistically low but





costs may be lower in areas of competition than in areas of no competition.5 4
Moreover, there are no significant economies of scale in the distribution
of electricity. In 1970, trends toward lower unit costs of distribution were
noted to be approaching the point of diminishing returns. Overhead con-
ductors were approaching practical limitations, and power factors had been
raised to near unity. As primary circuit voltages increase to serve greater
loads, the unit costs of line transformers, line switching, and protective
equipment also increase, limiting overall potential savings. 55 In 1979, distri-
bution economies were said to accrue from increased density of the service
area but not necessarily from increased scale.
56
The percent of the total cost of supplying retail power that is attributa-
ble to the operating cost of electric distribution has declined steadily. This
result has largely been due to the tremendous increase in power production
costs. Capital costs of distribution systems depend on a variety of manage-
rial decisions that are not subject to regulatory scrutiny. The managerial
decisions regarding distribution system design are not necessarily dictated by
outside economic forces. To the extent that regulation promotes over-capi-
talization, the response may be to design a system of less than optimum
efficiency.
The two major classes of distribution system design are: radial and net-
work. At least a dozen common variations of the major classes exist, with the
choice depending largely on the quality of service desired. The greatest
problem may be in selecting the equipment components in various parts of a
system that will provide the most economical design within the limits set.
For example, certain types of systems may have inherently better means of
regulating voltage than do others. Thus, when voltage regulation is pro-
vided at the distribution substation bus, auxiliary voltage regulation may be
needed on primary distribution lines having different loading cycles, e.g., a
residential feeder and an industrial feeder.
5 7
Similarly, large distribution substations having many primary feeders of
different lengths may require separate voltage regulation for each feeder.
However, it may be less expensive to regulate voltage at the substation bus
supplemented by pole-mounted regulators some distance from the substation
as needed.
58
A distribution system is cost sensitive to voltage because voltage must be
maintained between fairly definite limits at the point of delivery to permit
proper operation of equipment. 59 Maintaining closer limits than necessary
will result in higher system costs. Therefore, automatic regulating devices
must be carefully sized and located to insure economic system design.
60
54. Kemper, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-
560, Tr. 18, 385-89 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
55. FPC, Nattonal Power Survey (1970); Newberg, supra note 29, at 321.
56. U.S. Department of Energy, 2 THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY 376 (1979).
57. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 3 ELECTRIC UTILITY ENGINEERING REFERENCE BOOK:
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 5 (1965).
58. Id at 48.




Distribution engineering is, to a large extent, a matter of obtaining the
most economic combination of system components. Many different sizes
and ratings of equipment must be considered. This is particularly true in
designing a system to serve areas of varying load densities with uncertain
and different rates of load growth. Regulation cannot and does not provide
significant oversight of the utility's efficiency in designing its system. The
mere existence of regulation cannot be said to insure an optimal distribution
system design.
More important to considerations of natural monopoly is the constantly
changing nature of the area served. Thus, even if one assumed that a partic-
ular substation and feeder system were initially optimally designed, the de-
sign cannot be expected to remain optimal over the forty- to fifty-year life of
the facilities. For example, if the substation initially served a residential
neighborhood, with time the neighborhood may decay. Abandoned homes
lead to excess capacity, and homes converted to businesses and apartments
lead to a need to increase capacity. Some feeders from the substation may
begin to serve industrial loads. As a result, additional less optimal voltage
regulation may be required. If the firm no longer employs the lowest cost
method in supplying service, its claim to natural monopoly is questionable.
The primary effect of retail competition is reduction of the density of
the load served. Economically, the effect may be the same as holding the
load constant and expanding the area served. An extensive area can be
served by many distribution substations, each of relatively low kilovolt
amphere (kva) rating, or by a smaller number of larger substations. As the
system expands, transformer capacity, switching equipment, subtransmission
lines, and primary feeder circuits must be added in practicable and eco-
nomic increments. 6i However, a change in load resulting from competition
does not always result in a substantial reduction of facilities required. For
example, it is instructive to compare the facilities required to serve an area of
twelve square miles with a 23 kilovolt (kv) primary feeder system in which
the load density is 4000 kva per square mile with the facilities required to
serve the same total load spread over a twenty-four-square-mile area. The
load density for the twenty-four-square-mile area is 2000 kva per square mile
or half the load density of the twelve-square-mile area. In each situation,
one substation with a capacity of 4800 kva is required and five primary feed-
ers are required. 62 Thus even economies claimed to be attributable to load
density may prove to be ephemeral.
Other evidence also exists to demonstrate that the theoretical construct
of Figure 1 is relevant for analysis of the natural monopoly status of electric
utility firms. Primeaux's study of the cost of service in cities with competi-
tion is consistent with Figure 1.63 Similarly, the Cleveland Electric Illumi-
nating Company has made studies showing that its costs for service inside
the city of Cleveland, where it faces vigorous competition, are comparable to
61. Westinghouse, supra note 57, at 72.
62. Id at 84.
63. See Primeaux, supra note 36.
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its costs for service in areas where no competition exists. 64 Additionally,
economies of scale in management are probably smaller.
65
IV. THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION
If indeed the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly, economic
forces should dictate the disappearance of competition in the cities in which
it exists. Evidence of long-term competition can be found. For example,
competition has existed in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, for nearly seventy
years. Competition has existed in Sikeston, Missouri, for approximately fifty
years.66 A study of competition in Cleveland concluded:
After 20 years of rate regulation in Cleveland by means of competi-
tion, it is difficult to find any basis of fact in the contention that
this means regulation is wasteful because of duplicate investment
and thereby an ultimate burden on the consumers. The records
show that the citizens of Cleveland have received the lowest rates
in the entire country over a 20-year period, yet the competing utili-
ties have both made enormous profits even at these low rates.
6 7
When examining a situation in which competition exists, additional fac-
tors must be considered that will not be significant when the question is
simply one of whether competition should be initiated. If two utilities are
already competing, the costs of installing duplicating facilities are sunk costs.
The sale of either utility is unlikely to occur unless the selling utility is able to
recover in the sales price an amount equal to the cost of the facilities used to
provide the service. Moreover, the sales price is frequently based upon the
cost of replacing all facilities at current prices minus depreciation. Whereas
the rates are usually based upon original cost of plant minus depreciation.
Poles used in distribution construction are long-lived. Thus, reproduction
cost new will be substantially greater than the actual cost of the plant used
to provide the service. The purchasing utility will enter the cost of the plant
at the cost paid, e.g. reproduction cost new. The stepped-up cost of the plant
claimed to be used may affect rates charged by increasing the rate base of
the competing utility.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the purchasing utility would immediately
remove the duplicate facilities. More likely, the duplicate facilities will be
left in place and used by the purchasing utility for a number of years. Dupli-
cate facilities would be removed only when new construction causes reloca-
tion of pole lines to accommodate street widening or the like. This is
particularly true of mature service areas where additional load growth is not
of a magnitude to require a change in service.
The presumption that the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly
and that competition is to be discouraged in favor of regulation is outmoded
64. Bingham, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 2905-07 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
65. F. MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 52 (1952).
66. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 78.
67. E. KENEALY, THE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL LIGHT PLANT 109 (1935).
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and does not comport with economic realities. To the extent that regulation
rests upon natural monopoly assumptions, it must be reexamined.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF
COMPETITION BETWEEN ELECTRIC UTILITIES
The general trend of legislative, administrative, and judicial treatment
of competition between electric utilities has followed the old economic as-
sumption of natural monopoly. Frequently, legislative policies have been
influenced by industry lobbying. The underlying presumption has been that
duplication of facilities to permit competition is wasteful. Deciding what is
waste presupposes a number of value judgments as to the long-term good of
society and presents difficult questions for philosophers and welfare econo-
mists. Courts are not well equipped to make such determinations. More-
over, a significant lag exists between the recognition of new "truths" by
academicians and the acceptance of those "truths" by the courts. Judges
tend to apply the law in accordance with economic theories prevalent when
they were in college. Thus, the tendency is to freeze economic thought at
given points until a new generation of jurists is seated.
Many court and administrative decisions have held, without critical
analysis, that the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly. In Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co. ,68 the United States Supreme Court stated: "The very
reason for the regulation of private [electric] utility rates-by state bodies
and by the [Federal Power] commission-is the inevitability of
monopoly .... ,,69
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,70 the Court referred to electric utili-
ties as natural monopolies created by the economic forces of high threshold
capital requirements and virtually unlimited economies of scale. The Court
said in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 71 that each town is "a natural
monopoly market for the distribution and sale of electric power at retail."
72
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC,73 the Court spoke of the "basic natural
monopoly structure" of the electric power industry.
Other courts have also relied upon or referred to the presumed natural
monopoly status of utilities. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has referred
to the natural monopoly possessed by a utility company in a city as a "classic
case" of a lawful monopoly. 74 In Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co. ,7 a
case involving competitors for community antenna television business, the
68. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
69. Id at 596 n.33 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
70. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
71. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
72. Id at 369.
73. 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973). In a broader context, the court has said that in "those areas,
loosely spoken of as natural monopolies or-more broadly-public utilities . . . active regula-
tion has been found necessary to compensate for the inability of competition to provide ade-
quate regulation." FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 92 (1953).
74. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1979).
75. 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cer. dened, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
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same court gratuitously stated that house-to-house competition for customers
is not feasible for electric utilities.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that com-
petition between two electric suppliers would mean duplication and wasteful
investment. 76 That court has also said that in natural monopoly markets,
competition is sacrificed to avoid wasteful duplication of services and
investment.
77
In large part the above references to the natural monopoly status of the
electric utility industry are dicta and based either upon conclusory testimony
that merely parrotted traditional concepts or had no support in the record.
Such statements are picked up and repeated in other decisions without fur-
ther analysis, thereby perpetuating an assumption, the validity of which is
doubtful. In what may be the only carefully litigated proceeding reaching a
final decision as to the natural monopoly status of public utilities, the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
found that a natural monopoly did not exist .
7
The mistaken belief that competition by electric utilities is detrimental
to the public interest has resulted in the enactment by at least forty states of
legislation creating exclusive service territories. 79 However, where territorial
divisions have not been mandated by legislation, voluntary territorial alloca-
tions between electric utilities have been condemned asper se antitrust viola-
tions despite the assumed natural monopoly character of the industry.
80
A mistaken belief that electric utilities are natural monopolies has a ten-
dency to make regulators and courts insensitive to anti-competitive acts of
electric utilities. Further, antitrust standards more stringent than would be
applied if no natural monopoly were assumed may be imposed. Thus, a
court may conclude that market share is not evidence of monopoly power or
that predatory acts must be shown in addition to monopoly power.8 '
It has been shown that competition is possible at both the production
and distribution levels of the electric utility industry, and that competition
may be expected to provide substantial benefits which cannot be provided
by regulation. Without a conclusive showing that a particular utility is a
natural monopoly in a specific market, there is no reason to anticipate that
economic benefits will accrue from permitting a monopoly. Furthermore,
even upon a showing of natural monopoly, changes in technology may re-
move the natural monopoly situation.
76. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
77. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
78. Toledo Edison Co., 5 NRC 133, aJ'd 10 NRC 265 (1979).
79. Hjelmfelt, Exclusive Service Ternlories, Power Pooling, and Elecnc Utility Regulations, 38
FED. B.J. 21 (1979). Certification of service territories does not always end all competition. For
example, Utah Power & Light Co. was permitted to serve a mine located in Empire Electric
Assbiation's certified territory because the mine was located closer to existing facilities of Utah
Power & Light Co. Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979).
Contra Sende Vista Water Co. v. City of Phoenix, 127 Ariz. 42, 617 P.2d 1158 (1980).
80. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Pennsylvania Water &
Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950).
81. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
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VI. PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY CHANGES
The first and most obvious regulatory change necessary, once electric
utilities are recognized not to be natural monopolies, is the repeal of territo-
rial legislation. The disappearance of territorial legislation will not bring
about an explosion of retail competition, given the industry's deep-seated
bias against direct competition. Rather, competition can be anticipated to
continue to be impeded by unspoken gentlemen's agreements between
neighboring utilities. Nevertheless, even without a substantial increase in
direct competition, the elimination of territorial laws will create a potential
for competition, which may produce many of the benefits that could be ex-
pected from direct competition.
Second, utilities owning transmission facilities should be compelled to
make them available at reasonable cost on a space-available basis to any
utility desiring to use them. For a number of economic and environmental
reasons, the duplication of transmission facilities at present is frequently un-
feasible. At the same time, competition at wholesale for bulk power supplies
is not possible without the ability to "wheel" the power over a third party's
transmission system.8 2 Long-term, all-requirements contracts should be
carefully reviewed to determine whether the alleged benefits of assured bulk
power supply and greater ease of financing large generating facilities actu-
ally exist and outweigh the impediment to competition.
A third and more fundamental need is for legislators, regulators, and
courts to recognize that regulation is not a substitute for competition, but
rather is an adjunct to competition. For the present, regulation is necessary
because in most instances no more than two or three utilities will compete in
any given market. Competition between so few utilities-oligopolistic com-
petition-will not produce results equal to competition by many firms. Nev-
ertheless, every effort should be made to increase competition at both the
wholesale and retail levels.
An increase in wholesale competition may be required before retail
competition will substantially increase. Far too often the potential retail
competitor is dependent upon its retail rival for its source of supply. This
creates a price squeeze potential that has not been eliminated despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in FPC v. Conway Corp.8 3 that the Commission must
consider price squeeze issues in considering wholesale rates. To date, the
Commission's exercise of its price squeeze authority has been disap-
pointing,84 and the courts have been split as to their authority to grant relief
in price squeeze situations.8 5
82. After obtaining wheeling rights, the municipal electric system in Cleveland, Ohio, was
able to purchase bulk power from two additional suppliers. It is now purchasing at wholesale
from three different suppliers.
83. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
84. Hjelmfelt, 4 Ace Squeeze Thoyfor Implementation of Federal Power Commission v. Con-
way Corp., 50 U. CoLO. L. REV. 459 (1979); Report ofthe Committee on Antitrust, 1 ENERGY L. J.
107 (1980); compare City of Bethany v. FERC, Docket No. 80-1633 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).
85. Compare City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980)
(damages were awarded) with City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763




In 1972, Richard Hellman wrote that the only successful regulation of
electric utilities has been government competition and competitive interac-
tion.86 He concluded that the theory of natural monopoly, and the related
theory that regulation by state commissions provides a legal substitute for
competition, are incompatible with the facts. Based upon his case studies, he
found that: "[Ultility managements, when exposed to government competi-
tion, have lowered prices and gained sales. More crucially, their finances
have met the regulatory test of attracting capital for expansion. In a number
of cases, rates of return have risen and exceeded those of comparable compa-
nies not under competition.
'87
The years since Hellman's study was published have confirmed his con-
clusions. However, there is no reason to limit competition to a struggle for
customers between investor-owned and publicly-owned utilities. All utilities
should be compelled to compete. Competition is not only practicable, but it
promises to provide benefits not obtainable from regulation alone.
86. R. HELLMAN, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 70 (1972).
87. Id at 228.
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